edness, on or off. So I suggest that these terms "definition" and "possibility" might do more harm than good if our aim is to understand the machine and how it works. How can we determine the possibility of new media if new media are nothing but possibility machines? How can we define them if they are already cast from the mold of definition? To adopt a shorthand, one might summarize this state of affairs by asserting that the computer has hitherto been understood in terms of metaphysics. That is to say, when people speak about the computer as an "essencing machine" what they really mean is that computers simulate ontologies, they define horizons of possibility. This is the terrain of metaphysics. These sorts of

cally unlike other media. Instead of facilitating the metaphysical arrangement, the computer does something quite different: it simulates the metaphysical arrangement. In short, the computer does not remediate other physical media, it remediates metaphysics itself (and hence should be more correctly labeled a metaphysical medium). I shall refrain from saying it remediates mediation itself, but the temptation exists. The metaphysical "medium" of essences and instances is fundamentally dead today. And because it is dead, the medium of essences and instances reemerges in a new mediatic form, the computer. Informatic machines do not *participate* in the worldly logic of essences and instances, they simulate it. For example, prin-

Cinema so captured the twentieth-century imagination that it is common to assume that other media are also at root cinematic. And since the cinema is, in general, an ontology (in particular it is a phenomenology), it seems logical to assume that other media are ontological in the same way. The computer however, is not *of* an ontological condition, it is *on* that condition. It does not facilitate or make reference to an arrangement of being, it remediates the very conditions of being itself. If I may be so crude: the medium of the computer is being. But one must take this in an entirely unglamorous way.

The question is: How is artificial imagination as part of the *comprehensio aesthetica* able to open a new way to overcome the tension we mentioned above? Should we admit that artificial imagination, with its increasing power, is going to impose a stronger determination on us and limit the capacity to act? Art based on technology and media attempt to bring a new form of visual and audio experience to the public, but have they succeeded in bringing this experience beyond images? Or are they still misguided by the desire to create more and more images and bring forward richer sensual experiences?

spacecraft earth. Artificial organs have expanded at such speed and volume that the human soul can no longer accommodate them. This disproportion between the soul and artificial organs is the source of *hubris*, destruction, and the war we are witnessing today in Europe–and in the future at a global scale. In the context of this call to reflect on creativity after computation, one could ask: What can art do in this process of organological acceleration? Or perhaps another question should be asked first: Will the increasing power of machines finally render art obsolete? Machine learning algorithms can now produce images whose authorship is no longer easy to judge, which may surprise any master of painting. We might call it artificial imagination and ask whether this is the end of the infinite, meaning there is nothing fearful left in the infinite because human beings, with their technologies, will now be able to triumph over it. Or is this infinite itself a *limit* that has *yet to be infinitized*? I hope that through these questions,

You know – technology wasn't invented by us humans. Rather the other way around. As anthropologists and biologists admit, even the simplest life forms, infusoria (tiny algae synthesized by light at the edges of tidepools a few million years ago) are already technical devices. Any material system is technological if it filters information useful to its survival, if it memorizes and processes that information and makes inferences based on the regulating effect of behaviour, that is, if it intervenes on and impacts its environment so as to assure its perpetuation at least. A human being isn't different in nature from an object of this type. Its equipment for absorbing data isn't exceptional compared to other living things. What's true is that this human being is omnivorous when dealing with information because it has a regulating system (codes and rules of processing) that's more differentiated and a storage capacity for its memory that's greater than those of other living things. Most of all: it's equipped with a symbolic system that's both arbitrary (in semantics and syntax), letting it be less dependent on an immediate environment, and also 'recursive' (Hofstadter), allowing it to take into account (above and beyond raw data) the way it has of processing such data. That is, itself. Hence, of processing as information its own rules in turn and of inferring other ways of processing information. A human, in short, is a living organization that is not only complex but, so to speak, replex. It can grasp itself as a medium (as in medicine) or as an organ (as in goal-directed activity) or as an object (as in thought – I mean aesthetic as well as speculative thought). It can even abstract itself from itself and take into account only its rules

The body might be considered the hardware of the complex technical device that is human thought. If this body is not properly functioning, the ever so complex operations, the meta-regulations to the third or fourth power, the controlled deregulations of which you philosophers are so fond, are impossible. Your philosophy of the endless end, of immortal death, of interminable difference, of the undecidable, is an expression, perhaps the expression *par excellence*, of meta-regulation itself. It's as if it took itself into account as *meta*. Which is all well and good. But don't forget – this faculty of being able to change levels referentially derives solely from the symbolic and recursive power of language. Now language is simply the most complex form of the (living and dead) 'memories' that regulate all living things and make them technical objects better adjusted to their surroundings than mechanical ensembles. In other words your philosophy is possible only because the material ensemble called 'man' is endowed with very sophisticated software. But also, this software, human language, is dependent on the condition of the hardware. Now: the hardware will be consumed in the solar explosion taking philosophical thought with it (along with all other thought) as it goes up in flames.

So the problem of the technological sciences can be stated as: how to provide this software with a hardware that is independent of the conditions of life on earth.

That is: how to make thought without a body possible. A thought that continues to exist after the death of the human

But 'without a body' in this exact sense: without the complex living terrestrial organism known as the human body. Not without hardware, obviously.

So theoretically the solution is very simple: manufacture hardware capable of 'nurturing' software at least as complex (or replex) as the present-day human brain, but in non-terrestrial conditions. That clearly means finding for the 'body' envisaged a 'nutrient' that owes nothing to bio-chemical components synthesized on the surface of the earth through the use of solar energy. Or: learning to effect these syntheses in other places than on earth. In both cases then this means learning to manufacture a hardware capable of nourishing our software or its equivalent, but one maintained and supported only by sources of energy available in the cosmos generally.

It's clear even to a lay person like myself that the combined forces of nuclear physics, electronics, photonics and informa-tion science open up a possibility of constructing technical objects, with a capacity that's not just physical but also cognitive, which 'extract' (that is select, process and distrib-ute) energies these objects need in order to function from forms generally found everywhere in the cosmos.

So much for the hardware. As for the software such machines are to be equipped with – that's a subject for research in the area of artificial intelligence and for the controversies surrounding such research. You philosophers, writers and artists are quick to dismiss the pathetic track record of today's software programs. True – thinking or 'representing' machines (Monique Linard's term) are weak-lings compared to ordinary human brains, even untrained ones.

The following sketch illustrates this shift of focus:

	World	Image	Text	Technical Image
Code		←	←	←
Alienation	A1	A2	A3	
Level	Magic	History	???	

SKETCH 2.2

An algorithm encloses a world like a monad reflects the world in its entirety, and like the monads, algorithms construct the world according to simple axioms. However, this infinity is a numerical infinity. The computational world is a world of numbers and the milieu in which an algorithm can prove its existence. If we look at a machine learning algorithm of image recognition, an object, namely an image, is analyzed as a matrix of numbers; for example given a series of handwritten numbers, for the machine to recognize among many numbers the number 8, it will have to analyze the image in terms of a matrix of values and vectors; the algorithm of recognition itself is recursive since it continues improving itself by actualizing the deviation of errors.

Bernard Stiegler, in his *Technics and Time* vol. 3 (Stiegler, 2010), attempts to show that Kant's three syntheses, namely, apprehension in the intuition, reproduction in the imagination, and recognition in the concept will not be able to complete their functions without a fourth synthesis, which is artifact, since recognition implies that something is kept in memory, while this memory will also depend on external memory–for example, symbols, the concept of the infinite being only graspable through the sign ∞. We may want to follow Stiegler here by calling it the fourth synthesis. That is, imagination is not exclusively limited to the human mind, but rather it involves material supports without which the human mind will be limited to repetitive activities; for ex-

With the advancement of digital technology, the fourth synthesis constitutes a computational hermeneutics in which human and machine relation must be conceived as a recursive coupling, where the latter has more and more capacity to determine the former. We are not talking about humans on the one hand and recursive algorithms on the other; the reality is that we are all integrated into gigantic recursive operations, for example, Google Search.

Even if we follow the above argument that imagination is fundamentally artificial, we still need to clarify the role of "artificial imagination" in machines since machines are no longer just a passive medium of support but also actively participate in the cognitive process of imagination. However, this is not to say that artifacts before the computational age had no capacity to constitute the imagination. Art would, of course, be the counterexample since the question of imagination is fundamental in artistic, that is, artificial, creation and expression. In view of the banality that is given to the term artificial imagination, namely that machines will be able to replace visual artists in terms of art making, it will

It is unjust to equate modern computational machines with those of Descartes's time that were merely mechanical in nature; as argued in *Recursivity and Contingency*, modern computational machines are becoming organic as opposed to mechanic (Hui, 2019). Nonetheless, it is equally fallacious to mystify artificial imagination, especially concerning machine learning, with terms such as "non-supervised machine learning," with many thinking that this means without *telos*, with no specified goals; since this is incorrect, "non-supervision" simply means that the machine is allowed to automatically define data, for example, to classify raw data by giving them structures without following pregiven rules. The differences between the recursive process of imagination produced by machine learning and that of the human thus juxtaposed needs, therefore, to be clarified in different ways, and that is what I propose to now discuss regarding the concept of the infinite.

Ontology often receives top billing in questions philosophical, even in cases when its hegemony is not warranted. So let me restate the argument: the computer has hitherto been defined ontologically; but this approach (using the ontological concepts of possibility and definition) is dubious because the computer itself is already a matter of possibility and definition; thus if the computer might better be understood in terms of a practice or a set of executions or actions in relation to a world, the proper branch of philosophy that one should turn to is ethics or pragmatics, not ontology or metaphysics; as an ethics, the computer takes our execution of the world as the condition of the world's expression. And this is the interface effect again, only in different language: the computer is not an object, or a creator of objects, it is a process or active threshold mediating between two states.

vis previous, often inadequate, forms of cultural production. While the history of film and video practice is important, the greatest struggle of Internet art has been to prove its autonomy as an artistic practice—in the same way that video longed to be different from television. Marshall McLuhan offered a useful insight in this context. He wrote that the content of every new medium is generally the previous medium. That is to say, as new media formats appear historically, they often appear as mere wrappers for older formats—a perfect example of the logic of protocol.

In any serious discussion of analogy it's this experience that is meant, this blur, this uncertainty, this faith in the inexhaustibility of the perceivable, and not just a mode of transfer of the data onto an inscription-surface not originally its own. Similarly, writing plunges into the field of phrases, moving forward by means of adumbrations, groping towards what it 'means' and never unaware, when it stops, that it's only suspending its exploration for a moment (a moment that might last a lifetime) and that there remains, beyond the writing that has stopped, an infinity of words, phrases and meanings in a latent state, held in abeyance, with as many things 'to be said' as at the beginning. Real 'analogy' requires a thinking or representing machine to be *in* its data *just as* the eye is in the visual field or writing is in language (in the broad sense). It isn't enough for these machines to simulate the results of vision or of writing fairly well. It's a matter (to use the attractively appropriate locution) of 'giving body' to the artificial thought of which they are capable. And it's that body, both 'natural' and artificial, that will have to be carried far from earth before its destruction if we want the thought that survives the solar explosion to be something more than a poor binarized ghost of what it was beforehand.

information, defined as any nonrandom measurement or quality, has a tendency to be forgotten. This physical principle is seen throughout nature: When something falls apart, the information about its organization is in essence forgotten and chaotic arrangement sets in in the form of decay.

Since living animals tend to resist the entropic force, they are considered to violate this law of thermodynamics. Living animals don't fall apart during their life spans, and furthermore they resist informational disorder after death by propagating genetic information to their progeny. This defines their identity as vital forms. Genes and memes (themselves also genes, but in the realm of culture) are two ways of moving against the entropic force, by conserving information, even augmenting it, from living being to living being.

Flusser paraphrases this position well:

Like no other known living creature, we pass on not only inherited but also acquired information to future generations. In doing so, we negate nature twice: the second law of thermodynamics states that in nature all information has a propensity to be forgotten. Living creatures negate this principle, since they store and pass on genetic information [genes]. And Mendel's law states that acquired information cannot be transmitted from one organism to the next. Our species defies this law, too, for it stores acquired information [memes] in a cultural memory accessible to successive generations.[76]

The "information age"—a term irreverently tossed to and fro by many critics of contemporary life—is not simply that moment when computers come to dominate, but is instead that moment in history when matter itself is understood in terms of information or code. At this historical moment, protocol becomes a controlling force in social life.

Kittler documents this passage well when he writes about the transformation from a "kingdom of sense" in the year 1800 to a "kingdom of pattern" in 1900.[96] But what has been overlooked is that the transformation of matter into code is not only a passage from the qualitative to the quantitative *but also a passage from the non-aesthetic to the aesthetic—the passage from non-media to media.*

code for art making. LeWitt's art is an algorithmic process. The algorithm is prepared in advance, then later executed by the artist (or another artist, for that matter).

Code thus purports to be multidimensional. Code draws a line between what is material and what is active, in essence saying that writing (hardware) cannot *do* anything, but must be transformed into code (software) to be effective.

Northrop Frye says a very similar thing about language when he writes that the process of literary critique essentially creates a metatext, outside the original source material, that contains the critic's interpretations of that text.[41] In fact Kittler defines software itself as precisely that "logical abstraction" that exists in the negative space between people and the hardware they use.[42] Katherine Hayles has also reflected on the multidimensionality of digital signs. Her term "flickering signifiers" shows that digital images are the visible manifestations of underlayers of code often hidden.

But how can code be so different from mere writing? The answer to this lies in the unique nature of computer code. It lies not in the fact that code is sublinguistic, but rather in the fact that it is *hyper*linguistic. Code is a language, but a very special kind of language. *Code is the only language that is executable.*

As Kittler has pointed out, "There exists no word in any ordinary language which does what it says. No description of a machine sets the machine into motion."[43] The imperative voice (and what philosophers like Austin, Searle, and others talk about in the area of speech act theory) attempts to affect change through persuasion but has little real material affect.[44] So code

narcissism. Freud already listed three famous ones: man is not the centre of the cosmos (Copernicus), is not the first living creature (Darwin), is not the master of meaning (Freud himself). Through contemporary techno-science, s/he learns that s/he does not have the monopoly of mind, that is of complexification, but that complexification is not inscribed as a destiny in matter, but as possible, and that it takes place, at random, but intelligibly, well before him/herself. S/he learns in particular that his/her own science is in its turn a complexification of matter, in which, so to speak, energy itself comes to be reflected, without humans necessarily getting any benefit from this. And that thus s/he must not consider him/herself as an origin or as a result, but as a transformer ensuring, through techno-science, arts, economic development, cultures and the new memorization they involve, a supplement of complexity in the universe.

The instant which in Descartes marked the spiritual act, which was the timeless time of the understanding, here swings over to the side of material actuality. The bare monad forgets itself from one moment to the next. True mind is memory and anamnesis, continuous time. None the less, this memory remains local, limited to a 'point to view'. God alone has or is the memory of the whole, and of its programme. He alone has at his disposal all the 'notions' of the monads, of all the properties they develop, have developed, and will develop. Absolute memory, which is at the same time timeless act. The localization of the created monads is the spatial version of their temporality. They have a 'point of view' immanent to space because they are immanent to time, because they do not have enough memory, because they do not gather themselves sufficiently together.

tic. On this approach, language is itself immediately grasped as technique, and a technique of a higher rank, a metatechnique. As opposed to simple breaching, language-memory implies properties unknown to habit: the denotation of what it retains (thanks to its symbolic transcription), recursivity (the combinations of signs are innumerable, starting from simple generative rules, its 'grammar'), and self-reference (language-signs can be denoted by language-signs: metalanguage). I believe that generative and transformational linguistics has got much closer to the technicity of language than has functionalist linguistics. For *techne* is the abstract from *tikto* which means *to engender, to generate* [*tekontes*, the genitors; *teknon*, the offspring].

It is perfectly possible to say that the living cell, and the organism with its organs, are already *tekhnai*, that 'life', as they say, is already technique: the fact remains that its 'language' (genetic code, say) not only limits the performance of this technique but also (in fact it's the same thing) does not allow it to be objectified, known and complexified in a controlled way. The history of life on earth cannot be assimilated to the history of technique in the common sense, because it has not proceeded by remembering but by breaching.

By virtue of the properties just listed, as indefinite *auto-techne*, language, because of the infinite capacity this implies for it, simultaneously reveals what is finite in every inscription, including its own. For every inscription demands the selection of what is inscribed. Linguistic structures themselves are operators of exclusion at all levels: phonematic, semantic, mythic, narrative, etc. With the *logike techne*, the *rhetorike techne* and the *poetike techne*, the Greeks, Aristotle, do not only determine the groups of rules to be observed in the arts of argumentation, persuasion and charm, they also unveil the finitude of these usages, and thereby uncover the infinite horizon of what is *to be said*, the infinite task of generating new sentences and rules. A task that was in those days called philosophy – funny word. Philosophy was then

This is why this culture raises questions. Stiegler is right to insist on the need to make its specific modes of inscription (and therefore of memorization) available to individuals. School used to teach future citizens how to write. What institution has responsibility for teaching tele-graphy? Can the ideal pursued by such an institution still be the citizen? Is an institution for the telegraphization of humans even possible? Is the idea of an institution not linked to the State and to reading and writing? And thus to the ideal of a political body? It is abundantly clear in any case that States

If the new culture can produce such divergent effects, of generalization *and* destruction, this is because it seems to belong to the human domain neither by its aims nor its origins. As is clearly shown by the development of the techno-scientific system, technology and the culture associated with it are under a necessity to pursue their rise, and this necessity must be referred to the process of complexification (of neg-entropy) which takes place in the area of the cosmos inhabited by humanity. The human race is, so to speak, 'pulled forward' by this process without possessing the slightest capacity for mastering it. It has to adapt to the new conditions. It is even probable that this has always been the case throughout human history. And if we can become aware of that fact today, this is because of the exponential growth affecting sciences and technology.

The electronic and information network spread over the earth gives rise to a global capacity for memorizing which must be estimated at the cosmic scale, without common measure with that of traditional cultures. The paradox implied by this memory resides in the fact that in the last analysis it is nobody's memory. But 'nobody' here means that the body supporting that memory is no longer an earth-bound body. Computers never stop being able to synthesize more and more 'times', so that Leibniz could have said of this process that it is on the way to producing a monad much more 'complete' than humanity itself has ever able to be.

observe that capitalism is powerfully interested in this question of the proof. For the technologies required by the scientific process open the way for the production and distribution of new commodities, either directly committed to scientific research, or modified with a view to popular use. To this extent at least, means of knowledge become means of production, and capital appears as the most powerful, if it is not the only, apparatus for realizing the complexity attained in the field of cognitive languages. Capital does not govern the knowledge of reality, but it gives reality to knowledge.

It is often thought that if the economic system is led to behave in this way, it is because it is guided by the thirst for profit. And indeed, the use of scientific technologies in industrial production allows an increase in the quantities of surplus-value by saving on labour-time. Yet it seems that the 'ultimate' motor of this movement is not essentially of the order of human desire: it consists rather in the process of negentropy which appears to 'work' the cosmic area inhabited by the human race. One could go so far as to say that the desire for profit and wealth is no doubt no other than this process itself, working upon the nervous centres of the human brain and experienced directly by the human body.

signs that a new use of language is taking place, the stake of which is that of knowing objects as precisely as possible and of realizing among ordinary speakers a consensus as broad as that supposed to reign in the scientific community.

As for the second condition required by 'cognitive' language, which is the necessity of administering the proof of the assertion, it carries the implication that the technologies be continually developed. For if the propositions to be verified (or falsified) are to be more and more sophisticated, then the apparatus given the task of providing relevant sensory data must be indefinitely refined and complexified. Particle physics, electronics and data processing are today indispensable for conceiving (and realizing) most 'machines for proving'. I

neutralizing the future. What are called the human sciences, for example, have become largely a branch of physics. Mind and even soul are studied as though they were interfaces in physical processes, and this is how computers are starting to be able to deliver simulacra of certain mental operations.

(2) Capital is not an economic and social phenomenon. It is the shadow cast by the principle of reason on human relations. Prescriptions such as: communicate, save time and money, control and forestall the event, increase exchanges, are all likely to extend and reinforce the 'great monad'. That 'cognitive' discourse has conquered hegemony over other genres, that in ordinary language, the pragmatic and inter-relational aspect comes to the fore, whilst 'the poetic' appears to deserve less and less attention – all these features of the contemporary language-condition cannot be understood as effects of a simple modality of exchange, i.e. the one called 'capitalism' by economic and historical science. They are the

and thus becoming less directly dependent on the event. So the more complete the monad, the more the incoming event is neutralized. For a monad supposed to be perfect, like God, there are in the end no bits of information at all. God has nothing to learn. In the mind of God, the universe is instantaneous.

The growth of techno-scientific systems appears to be drawn by this ideal of *Mathesis Universalis* or, to use Borges's metaphor, the library of Babel. Complete information means neutralizing more events. What is already known cannot, in principle, be experienced as an event. Consequently, if one wants to control a process, the best way of so doing is to subordinate the present to what is (still) called the 'future', since in these conditions the 'future' will be completely predetermined and the present itself will cease opening onto an uncertain and contingent 'afterwards'.

Better: what comes 'after' the 'now' will have to come 'before' it. In as much as a monad in thus saturating its memory is stocking the future, the present loses its privilege of being an ungraspable point from which, however, time should always distribute itself between the 'not yet' of the future and the 'no longer' of the past.

The importance of the technologies constructed around electronics and data processing resides in the fact that they make the programming and control of memorizing, i.e. the synthesis of different times in one time, less dependent on the conditions of life on earth. It is very probable that among the material complexes we know, the human brain is the most capable of producing complexity in its turn, as the production of the new technologies proves. And as such, it also remains the supreme agency for controlling these technologies.

conference, Bernard Stiegler underlined three points:

1 technology is not, and probably never has been, a means for an end that would be science;
2 on the contrary (Habermas's) 'techno-science' is the present completion of a *tekhnologos* constitutively at work in the western *logos* (even if the Greek *tekhnai* were above all, at first, ways with language, logotechniques);
3 and finally, as the new technologies are now invading public space and common time (invading them in the form of industrial objects of production and consumption, including 'cultural' production and consumption), on a planetary scale, it is what we might call the most 'intimate' space-time, in its most 'elementary' syntheses, which is attacked, hounded and no doubt modified by the present state of technology.

agro-alimentry products. Secrets must be put into circuits, writings programmed, tragedies transcribed into bits of information. Protocols of transparency, scenarios of operationality. After all, I'll take it, your *domus*, it's saleable, your nostalgia, your love, let me get on with it. It might come in useful. The secret is capitalized swiftly and efficiently. – But that the secret should be a secret of nothing, be uncultivated, senseless, already in the *domus*, the megalopolis has no idea. Or rather, it has only the idea. Whereas the secret, because it consists only in the timbre of a sensitive, sentimental matter, is inaccessible except to stupor.

The walls will never be really cast down. Hence the MELANCHOLIA of all landscapes. We owe them a debt. They immediately demand the deflagration of the mind, and they obtain it immediately. Without it, they would be places, not landscapes. And yet the mind never burns enough.

It is a question of MATTER. Matter is that element in the datum which has no destiny. Forms domesticate it, make it consumable. Especially visual perspectives, and modes and scales of sound. Forms of sensibility which have come under the control of the understanding without difficulty. Things are less clear when it comes to their lower sisters who smell, drink in and touch. For a beautiful visual landscape, walking without any goal, strolling and the desire to wander simply

savoir-vivre is not enough. A glimpse of the inhuman, and/or of an unclean non-world [*l'immonde*]. Is this still a form of order, a different form of order, as Kant suggests in his vesania? A displacement of the vanishing point? A vanishing of a standpoint, rather.

We should describe, succeed in describing. Find a rhythm for the sentences, choose the words on the basis of their specific deviation from phonetic and lexical habits, rework conventional syntax. Get closer to singularity, to the ephemeral. But perhaps it is impossible to describe with any spiritual accuracy, with any accuracy of the soul (I will not even speak of feelings) without recounting how, where and when it happened. Without supplying a framework. For it is at this point, one might think, that landscape's power to dissolve really makes itself felt in the sense that it interrupts narratives. If that is the case, we are not looking for a lexical

opposed to the calm feeling of beauty. At the edge of the break, infinity, or the absoluteness of the Idea can be revealed in what Kant calls a negative presentation, or even a non-presentation. He cites the Jewish law banning images as an eminent example of negative presentation: optical pleasure when reduced to near nothingness promotes an infinite contemplation of infinity. Even before romantic art had freed

Art does not imitate nature, it creates a world apart, *eine Zwischenwelt*, as Paul Klee will say; *eine Nebenwelt*, one might say in which the monstrous and the formless have their rights because they can be sublime.

towards the nothingness of being-there. In description, writing tries to meet the challenge of being equal to its momentary absence. Not only is it always too late (nostalgia); words themselves are outrageously cumbersome, that is, at once too wretched and arrogant to designate the superplenitude of this void state (melancholia; we will always owe landscape a debt; impossible mourning). Poetry arises out of this understanding of wretchedness; otherwise it is merely a staging [*mise en scène*] and a mobilization [*mise en oeuvre*] of the powers of language. It is the writing [*écriture*] of the impossible description; DESCRIPTURE [*décriture*]. And the difference between describing and recounting should not be confused with deferring, which is the fate that awaits the mind when it tries to grasp itself through logic, theory of knowledge or of literature, narrative or essays. It is matter as landscape that is at stake in poetic descripture, and not the forms in which it can be inscribed. Poetry tries not to tame the forms which form language, not to procure the inscription which retains the event of the landscape. It tries to slip by before its withdrawal.